DOT Emergency Response Guidebook (DOT, 2016)

X

DOT ERG Diagram

Transportation Incidents

Isolation Zone (note: for Uranium Hexafluoride, Guide 166, has additional isolation zone guidance.)

Immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at least 25m (75 feet) in all directions.

For a large Spill consider 100m (330 feet) downwind

For a “large quantity involved in a fire” consider 300m (1000 feet) in all directions.

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at least 25m (75 feet) in all directions

Large Spill: Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100m (330 feet).

Fire: When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300m (1000 feet) in all directions.

Evacuate Public

Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and structural firefighters’ protective clothing will provide adequate protection against internal radiation exposure, but not external radiation exposure

Pros:  The ERG is considered a primary reference for the HAZMAT community due to HAZWOPR training requirements and recommendations based on the ERG will have broad acceptance.   

Cons:  The recommendations are based on a transportation accident and take into account the robust packaging and source controls required by DOT.  Because of this, these controls may not be suitable for intentional misuse of radioactive material.

IAEA Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, 2006 (IAEA, 2006)

X

IAEA Diagram

Unshielded or damaged potentially dangerous source (outside)

Inner cordoned area (also called the “Hot Zone”)

30m in all directions from the source

Taken from Table 1 of the (IAEA, 2006) and provides suggestions for the approximate size of the inner cordoned area for various radiological emergencies. These sizes are based on an examination of emergencies involving the largest amounts of radioactive material that could be encountered and on international guidance for transport.

The actual boundaries should be defined in the way that they are easily recognizable (e.g. roads) and secured. However, the safety perimeter should be established at least as far from the source as indicated in Table 1 from (IAEA, 2006), until the radiological assessor has assessed the situation.

Precautions should be taken to protect the responders and the public from potential external exposure and contamination.  The first responders should establish, as appropriate, facilities and areas shown in Figure.

Pros:  The IAEA 1^st responder guidance is very similar to the ERG (30m instead of 25m) for damaged/unshielded source, except they added RDD guidance (2 rows below) and state their recommendations could be applied outside of the transportation accident scenario.   

Cons: Presumes accident not intentional exposure. Presumed source sizes are still based on an examination of emergencies involving the largest amounts of radioactive material that could be encountered and on international guidance for transport.

IAEA Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, 2006 (IAEA, 2006)

X

IAEA Diagram

Major spill from a potentially dangerous source (outside)

Inner cordoned area (also called the “Hot Zone”)

100m in all directions from the source

same as above

same as above

Pros:  The IAEA 1^st responder guidance is the same as the ERG for the “Major Spill” category, except they state their recommendations could be applied outside of the transportation accident scenario.   

Cons: Presumes accident not intentional exposure.  Presumed source sizes are still based on an examination of emergencies involving the largest amounts of radioactive material that could be encountered and on international guidance for transport.

IAEA Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, 2006

(IAEA, 2006)

X

IAEA Diagram

Fire, explosion or fumes involving a potentially dangerous source (outside)

Inner cordoned area (also called the “Hot Zone”)

300m in all directions from the source

same as above

same as above

Pros:  The IAEA 1^st responder guidance is the same as the ERG for the “Fire/Explosion” category, except they state their recommendations could be applied outside of the transportation accident scenario.   

Cons: Presumes accident not intentional.  Presumed source sizes are still based on an examination of emergencies involving the largest amounts of radioactive material that could be encountered and on international guidance for transport.

IAEA Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, 2006

(IAEA, 2006)

X

IAEA Diagram

Damage, loss of shielding or spill involving a potentially dangerous source (inside a building)

Inner cordoned area (also called the “Hot Zone”)

Affected and adjacent areas (including floors above and below)

same as above

same as above

Pros:  The IAEA 1^st responder guidance is currently the only guidance for an indoor accident. Although recommendations are common sense, it is nice to have a reference.

Cons: Can only be used for indoor event.

IAEA Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, 2006 (IAEA, 2006)

 
click to expand

X

IAEA Diagram

Fire or other event involving a potentially dangerous source (inside a building) that can spread materials throughout the building (e.g. through the ventilation system)

Inner cordoned area (also called the “Hot Zone”)

Entire building and appropriate outside distance as indicated above

same as above

same as above

Pros:  The IAEA 1^st responder guidance is currently the only guidance for an indoor accident. Although recommendations are common sense, it is nice to have a reference.

Cons: Can only be used for indoor event.

IAEA Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, 2006 (IAEA, 2006)

X

IAEA Diagram

Suspected bomb (potential RDD), exploded or unexploded

Inner cordoned area (also called the “Hot Zone”)

400 m radius or more to protect against an explosion

same as above

same as above

Pros:  The IAEA 1^st responder guidance is similar to the ERG except for this “RDD” category.  Includes unexploded RDD concerns.

Cons: It is unclear how the 400m distance was derived, but may be driven by explosive (shrapnel) protection as much as radiological issues.

RDD Response Guidance; Planning for the First 100 Minutes (DHS, 2017)

X

Direction of Contamination

Explosive RDD (Dirty Bomb) Incidents

Hot Zone

Shelter-in-Place Zone

250m in all direction (Hot Zone)

500m in all Directions and 2,000m downwind (Shelter-in-Place Zone)

Until radiological measurements are available, enforce the initial Shelter-in-Place Zone set at 500 m (~1600 ft) in all directions from the point of detonation. When the direction of the contamination is confirmed by radiological measurements, extend the Shelter-in-Place Zone out to 2000 m (~1.2 miles) in the direction of the contamination to protect the public from low-level contamination and external radiation from fallout on the ground (see Figure)

Hot Zone entry should be limited to first responders conducting lifesaving rescue operations.

First responders should continue to operate as needed in the Shelter-in-Place Zone, but all members of the general public should be instructed to remain indoors until notified when and how to leave the immediate area.

Pros:  Based on extensive testing of explosive dispersal of RDD material and likely “worst case” source sizes.  Assessment includes the possible range of ballistic fragments and hazardous “smoke” contamination.  The guidance provides initial protective ranges to avoid deterministic effects and minimize exposure.

Cons: Optimized for the urban environment where manageable area can be limited. In sub-urban or rural areas, or if a very large source (i.e., > 10,000Ci) is suspected, consider larger initial areas.

Updated Emergency Response Guidance for The First 48 H

After the Outdoor Detonation of An Explosive Radiological Dispersal Device, (Musolino, 2013)

RDD Incidents

Hot Zone

Shelter-in-Place Zone

250m in all direction (Hot Zone)

500m in all Directions and 2,000m downwind (Shelter-in-Place Zone)

The two key zones are overlaid on a notional dense urban environment: (1) an initial Hot Zone that extends 250 m in all directions from the site of the incident; and (2) a wider initial Shelter-in-Place Zone, 500 m in all directions from the incident site and 2,000 m downwind.

Once sufficient quantitative radiation measurements are collected and mapped, the recommendations by the National Council of Radiation Protection and Measurements should be used to define the Hot Zone boundary more precisely (NCRP 165)

This is the application of technical data produced by the national laboratories that was operationalized by experts in emergency response.  It is the technical basis for the DHS RDD Response Guidance (same pros/cons).

FRMAC Assessment Manual Volume 2

(DOE, 2010)

No Diagram

RDD

Hot Zone, or boundary

Within 500 m

The area of highest concern is limited to the area within 500 m of the release in the more probable scenarios. The area of highest concern is defined as the area in which acute effects, a lifetime inhalation dose of 1 Sv (100 rem) or a 50 mSv (5 rem) groundshine dose (5-hour exposure), might occur. This implies that the initial response should be to set up a Hot Zone, or boundary, within 500 m (if nothing is known about the release) or at 0.01 Gy/h (1 rad/h) if exposure rate measurements are available (HARPER05).

Based on 2007 work by Fred Harper and Musolino which evaluated a large number of RDD surrogate tests and looked at the potential impacts of very large sources.  This reference has been superseded by the 2013 “ Updated Emergency Response Guidance for The First 48 H After the Outdoor Detonation of an Explosive Radiological Dispersal Device” which updated the guidance based on additional tests and operational considerations.  The update resulted in a smaller Hot Zone area for the urban environment and the addition of the control zone for Shelter area that matched the 500m radius.

Pros:  Based on extensive testing of explosive dispersal of RDD material and likely “worst case” source sizes. 

Can be useful for non-urban environments.

Cons: The 500m recommendation was updated with additional studies and operational information for the urban environment.   The smaller ranges in the RDD response guidance should be used, especially in an urban environment.

NCRP Report 165: Responding to a Radiological or Nuclear Terrorism Incident: A Guide for Decision Makers (NCRP, 2010)

No Diagram

RDD Incidents

Hot Zone

500 m in all directions

For an RDD, an initial Hot Zone boundary should be established ~1,600 feet (500 m) in all directions from the point of dispersion until measurements are made.

If it is known that the source used in the incident had an activity <10,000 Ci (370 TBq), then the initial Hot Zone boundary can be established at a radius of ~800 feet (250 m).  (Musolino and Harper, 2006).

Emergency responders who enter the Hot Zone should be equipped with radiation monitoring equipment that provides unambiguous alarms, based on predefined levels, to facilitate decision making. It is recommended that the instrument alarm when the exposure rate reaches 10 R/h (~0.1 Gy/h), corresponding to the recommended value for the inner perimeter of the dangerous-radiation zone, and when the cumulative absorbed dose reaches the decision dose of 50 rad (0.5 Gy) (NCRP, 2005).

PUBLIC Recommendation: NCRP recommends that the initial public protective action for both radionuclide dispersion incidents and nuclear detonations be early, adequate sheltering followed by delayed, informed evacuation. Until the level and extent of contamination can be determined, efforts should be made to avoid being outdoors in potentially-contaminated areas

Based on 2007 work by Fred Harper and Musolino which evaluated a large number of RDD surrogate tests and looked at the potential impacts of very large sources.  This reference has been superseded by the 2013 “Updated Emergency Response Guidance for The First 48 H After the Outdoor Detonation of an Explosive Radiological Dispersal Device” which updated the guidance based on additional tests and operational considerations.  The update resulted in a smaller Hot Zone area for the urban environment and the addition of the control zone for Shelter area that matched the 500m radius.

Pros:  Based on extensive testing of explosive dispersal of RDD material and likely “worst case” source sizes. 

Can be useful for non-urban environments.

Cons: The 500m recommendation was updated with additional studies and operational information for the urban environment.   The smaller ranges in the RDD response guidance should be used, especially in an urban environment.